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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction

is conferred

on this Court pursuant to

Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether Nicholls has failed to "marshal the evi-

dence" in support of the district court's findings of fact and to
show that the findings are "clearly erroneous?"
2.

Whether the findings of fact and conclusions of

law entered by the district court are consistent with and supported by the evidence adduced at trial?
3.
Nicholls'

Whether

motions

the

for

district

summary

court

judgment

on

properly
the

denied

grounds

that

Nicholls' credibility was at issue and that there existed a genuine issue of material fact —

namely, whether Nicholls' Travelers

Cheques had been lost or stolen?
4.

Whether the district court correctly taxed costs

against Nicholls?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Richard Douglas Nicholls ("Nicholls") purchased $99,000

of

American

Toronto,
Cheques
Express

Express

Canada,
had

been

Travel

Travelers
Nicholls
lost

Related

or

Cheques
later

stolen
Services

-1-

in

claimed
and

his

home

that

demanded

Company,

town

of

the Travelers
that

Inc.

American
("American

Express"), the issuer of the Cheques, issue a refund or replace
the Travelers Cheques.

American Express denied the claim because

of many suspicious circumstances surrounding it.

Nicholls then

brought suit against American Express in Utah, asserting claims
for

(1) breach

of contract,

(2) mental anguish and distress,

(3) negligence and reckless indifferences,

(4) conversion, and

(5) constructive fraud.
Shortly after Nicholls filed the Complaint, he filed a
motion

for

summary

judgment

arguing

that

American

Express

breached its contract with Nicholls by refusing to issue a refund
or to replace the Travelers Cheques.

American Express filed a

responsive memorandum supported by Rule 56(f) affidavits of Mark
S. Webber, counsel

for American

Express, and Bruce Barr, the

American Express Corporate Security Manager in Toronto.

American

Express argued that summary judgment should be denied because the
case involved material issues of fact that turned on Nicholls'
credibility or, in the alternative, the motion was premature and
should be continued to allow American Express an opportunity to
complete its investigation and discovery.

The hearing was post-

poned until further discovery was completed.

On March 9, 1992,

the hearing was held and the district court denied the motion for
summary judgment on the bases that Nicholls' credibility was at
issue and that a factual issue existed as to whether the Cheques
had, in fact, been lost or stolen.

-2-

Nicholls subsequently filed

another motion for summary judgment arguing that Nicholls/ credibility should not be an issue in a motion for summary judgment.
On June 23, 1992, the court again denied the motion on the same
bases.
A two-day bench trial was held on July 7 and 8, 1992.
On July 14, 1992, after hearing all the evidence adduced at trial
and after judging the credibility of Nicholls and of the other
witnesses, the district court announced its bench ruling in favor
of American Express.

(R. 1613-1625, 1033-1041, Addendum 3 ) .

As

evidenced by the record, the court viewed the case as turning on
the credibility of Nicholls.

For numerous reasons stated on the

record, the court did not believe Nicholls' testimony and specifically found that the Travelers Cheques had not been lost or stolen.
not

Accordingly, the court also found that American Express did
breach

the

purchase

agreements

entered

into

at

the

time

Nicholls purchased the Travelers Cheques and did not engage in
any tortious conduct against Nicholls.
On August 12, 1992, American Express filed a motion to
tax costs against Nicholls.

On August 14, 1992, Nicholls filed a

Notice of Objections to the Proposed Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment.

On

Motions, Motion

September

4,

1992, Nicholls

filed

a Notice

of

for New Trial, Motion to Set Aside Judgment,

Motion for Judgment for Plaintiff.

On September 21, 1992, the

district court heard all of Nicholls' objections to the findings,
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conclusions and judgment and all of his post-trial motions.
court

granted

Nicholls'

American

various

Express7

post-trial

motion

to

motions

tax

and

costs,

overruled

The

denied
all

of

Nicholls' objections to the findings, conclusions and judgment.
The

findings,

Express

were

1039-1041,

conclusions

and

entered

on

August

28,

1 and

2) .

In

Addendums

judgment

submitted
1992.

this

by

(R.

appeal

American

103 3-1038,
Nicholls

is

challenging all of the foregoing determinations.
B.

Statement of Facts

The following facts were adduced at trial and support
the district court's findings, conclusions, and judgment:
1.

On May 8, 1990, Nicholls purchased $17,000 worth

of American Express Travelers Cheques.

He testified he took them

to his office and placed them in his unlocked desk drawer.

He

said he did not tell anyone that he had purchased the Cheques or
that he had put them in the desk drawer.
2.

(R. 656, 1226, 1250).

On Wednesday, May 30, 1990, Nicholls purchased an

additional $82,000 worth of American Express Travelers Cheques.
He testified that prior to going to the American Express office
in Toronto, Canada to purchase the Travelers Cheques, he removed
the $17,000 in Travelers Cheques from his desk drawer and placed
them in his briefcase.

He said he took the briefcase with him to

the American Express office and, after purchasing the $82,000 in
Cheques,
Cheques.

placed
He

them

said

in

the

briefcase

the briefcase
-4-

also

with

the

contained

$17,000

two

or

in

three

credit cards and a driver's license.

After leaving the American

Express office, Nicholls placed the briefcase into the trunk of
his car.

(R. 657, 1230, 1275-1278).
3.

Cheques

to

Nicholls
buy

testified

equipment

for

he

his

purchased

business

at

the
an

planned to attend in Sweden on Tuesday, June 5, 1990.

Travelers
auction

he

He said he

bought the Cheques on Wednesday, even though he was not scheduled
to leave the country until Sunday, June 3, because he wanted to
be organized for this important buying trip.
4.

Nicholls had never before used Travelers Cheques

to purchase equipment at auctions.
5.

(R. 1276, 1278).

Nicholls

testified

(R. 1279).
that

after

purchasing

the

$82,000 in Travelers Cheques, he returned to his office later
that afternoon and left the briefcase containing the Cheques in
the trunk of his car.

He said that after closing his office

later that afternoon, he went home and again left the briefcase
in the trunk.
6.

(R. 1280).
Nicholls testified that from the time he purchased

the Cheques on Wednesday, May 30, until the time he arrived at
the airport on Sunday, June 3, he never checked in his trunk for
the briefcase containing the Travelers Cheques.
7.

(R. 1281-1284).

Nicholls testified he never observed any evidence

that the trunk had been broken into.

-5-

(R. 1281).

8.
airport

on

Nicholls

testified

Sunday, June

3,

that

before

1990, he packed

leaving
his

for

the

suitcase

and

placed several items in a leather folder that he intended to take
with him.

He said he put the suitcase into the trunk of his car

and drove to the airport.

He said his briefcase was still in the

trunk of his car when he opened the trunk and placed his suitcase
in it.

However, he said he did not open the briefcase to confirm

the Cheques were still there.
9.

(R. 1282-1284).

Nicholls testified he kept the briefcase with him

on the flight because he was concerned about the safety of the
Cheques.
open

the

However, not once during the seven hour flight did he
briefcase

to

verify

that

all-important Travelers Cheques.
10.

it

still

contained

the

(R. 1283-1284).

Nicholls testified that on Monday, June 4, 1990,

he arrived in Sweden.

He said he rented a car, drove to the

hotel, and used a credit card rather than Travelers Cheques to
pay for the hotel and the rental car.

He said the credit card

that he used to pay for the hotel and the rental car was not one
of the credit cards that was in the briefcase.
11.

Nicholls testified

(R. 1284-1285).

that after checking

into his

hotel, he took the briefcase with him to his room, but at no time
that evening or night did he open his briefcase to verify the
Travelers Cheques were still there.
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(R. 1285).

12.

Nicholls testified that on Tuesday, June 5, 1990,

he drove to the site of the auction.

He said that he inspected

the forklift trucks, attended the auction, and bid on ten or
twelve pieces of equipment, but that he did not have the high bid
on any piece of equipment.
tion.

He did not buy anything at the auc-

He said during the time he was inspecting the equipment

and bidding on it, the briefcase remained in the rental car.

(R.

1285-1286).
13.

Nicholls testified he left the auction, returned

to the hotel room shortly after lunch, and checked out.

He said

he then drove to Stockholm, Sweden and spent the night at the
Stockholm Hotel.

He said he took the briefcase with him into his

hotel room, but again, he supposedly did not open the briefcase
to verify that the Cheques were there.
14.

(R. 1285-1286).

He testified that on Wednesday, June 6, he checked

out of the hotel, drove to the airport, and took a return flight
to Toronto, Canada.

Again, he said he kept the briefcase with

him during the return flight and, again, he said not once during
the flight did he open the briefcase to see if the Travelers
Cheques were there.
15.

(R. 1288).

Nicholls testified that when he arrived to Toronto

on the evening of June 6, he placed the suitcase and briefcase in
the trunk of his car and drove home.

He said that upon arriving

home, he took the briefcase and suitcase into his house.
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He said

he did not open the briefcase that night to see if the Cheques
were there.

(R. 1288).

16.

Nicholls testified that on Thursday, June 7, he

went to work but did not take the briefcase with him.

He said

that on Friday, June 8, he took the briefcase with him to work,
and that at about mid-morning he opened the briefcase and discovered

for the first time that the Cheques were missing.

(R.

1289).
17.
Lake

City

On Friday, June 8, 1990, Nicholls called the Salt

Office

of

American

Express

and

Cheques had allegedly been lost or stolen.

reported

that

the

On June 17, 1990, he

made written demand on American Express for either a refund of
the $99,000 or replacement Cheques.
18.

American

Express

(R. 657, 1290).

asked

Nicholls

for

two

refer-

ences, and Nicholls gave the names of George Valante and Len
Jones.

(R. 1290).
19.

Mr. Valante

had

been

a

friend

of

Nicholls

for

eight to ten years and had done some bookkeeping work for him.
Mr. Valante was the boyfriend of Debbie Jones, who was Nicholls7
bookkeeper and the person who had loaned Nicholls $20,000, which
was part of the money that Nicholls used to obtain the $99,000
worth of Travelers Cheques.
Nicholls 7 company in 1990.

Valante was one of three owners of
(R. 1290-1291).
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20.

Mr.

Jones

approximately ten years.
and

had

been

Nicholls7

had

been

a

friend

of

Nicholls

for

Mr. Jones owned an insurance brokerage
insurance

agent

for

ten

years.

(R.

1291-1292).
21.

Pursuant

to

American

Express7

instructions,

on

Saturday, June 9, Nicholls called the Toronto police and reported
the loss of the Travelers Cheques.
22.

(R. 657).

Mr. Bruce Barr ("Barr"), the American Express Cor-

porate Security officer in Toronto, investigated Nicholls7 claim.
On Wednesday, June 13, 1990, Barr met with Nicholls and Nicholls7
Toronto

counsel

at

the

American

Express

office

in

Toronto.

Nicholls told Barr that from the time he purchased the Cheques on
May 30, 1990, until the time he reported them as being lost or
stolen, to his knowledge no one else had seen or handled the
Cheques.

Barr made

inquires through the security

offices of

local banks and trust companies in the Toronto area regarding any
association with Nicholls, and he visited all 22 of the locations
where the Cheques had been cashed.
23.

(R. 1224-1228, 1230-1235).

$87,000 worth of the Travelers Cheques were cashed

at 22 different locations throughout the Toronto area.

$39,000

worth were cashed at 13 different locations on Thursday, May 31,
1990; $18,000 worth were cashed at six different

locations on

Friday, June 1, 1990; $9,000 worth were cashed at two different
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locations on Monday, June 4, 1990; and $21,000 worth were cashed
at two different locations on Thursday, June 7, 1990.
24.

(R. 658).

Based on his investigation of the claim, Barr was

suspicious of Nicholls and believed the claim to be fraudulent.
He recommended that American Express deny the claim, and American
Express followed this recommendation.
25.

(R. 658, 1235).

On August 15, 1990, Nicholls filed a civil action

in Utah against American Express, alleging breach of contract and
tortious misconduct.
26.

(R. 2 ) .

Barr prepared a written report of his investiga-

tion and, on August 29, 1990, he met with the Toronto Police and
submitted his report.
27.

(R. 1236, 1483).

The case was assigned to Detective Peter Baxter

("Baxter") of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department.

Baxter

was a detective assigned to the fraud and forgery squad of the
police department, where he had worked for 23 years.
28.

A

large

quantity

of American

Express

(R. 1482).
Travelers

Cheques were delivered with the report, and both the report and
the Cheques were given to Baxter.
29.
Lake City.

(R. 1488).

On November 2, 1990, Nicholls was deposed in Salt

His testimony included a statement that from the time

he purchased the $82,000 on Wednesday, May 30, 1990 until the
time he allegedly

discovered

them missing
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on Friday, June 8,

1990,

no one to his knowledge had either seen or handled the

Travelers Cheques.
30.

On

(R. 1296).
Friday,

September

21, 1990, Baxter

sent the

Travelers Cheques included with the report to the Document Section

of

the

Forensic

Identification

Services

of

the

Toronto

Police Department to have the Cheques examined for fingerprints.
(R. 658, 1488).
31.

After examining the Cheques, on March 11, 1991,

the police identified fingerprints on them belonging to Mr. Paul
Pauze

(77Pauze77), a long-time business associate and friend of

Nicholls.

(R. 658, 1501-1502).
32.

The fingerprints of Pauze were found on both the

Cheques purchased on May 8, which initially had been placed in
Nicholls7 desk drawer, and the Cheques purchased on May 30, which
were supposedly placed
trunk.

in Nicholls7 briefcase and kept in his

(R. 658, 1504).
33.

Pauze and Nicholls had been friends and business

associates for 10 years.

Pauze and his wife and Nicholls and his

wife would occasionally get together at one another7s house for
barbecues or drinks.
34.

(R. 1326).

Pauze and Nicholls have gone to Atlantic City on

gambling trips on three separate occasions and have also gone to
Las Vegas together.

In fact, at least one and maybe two of the
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gambling trips occurred after Pauze had been arrested and accused
of stealing Nicholls7 Travelers Cheques.
35.

After

learning

that

(R. 1326-1327).

Pauze's

fingerprints

were

found on both groups of Cheques, on July 17, 1991, Baxter met
with Nicholls and his counsel to review the report submitted by
Barr and to confirm that Nicholls knew of no one who had touched
or seen the Travelers Cheques.

Baxter took to the meeting a page

of type-written points he needed to cover with Nicholls.

They

went

tell

through

Nicholls

these

about

points

Pauze's

one

by

prints

one.

being

Baxter
found

on

did
the

not

Cheques.

Nicholls and his counsel made a few changes to the points Baxter
had prepared, and confirmed the accuracy of them.

According to

Nicholls, no one else knew that he had purchased the Cheques and,
to his knowledge, they had never been handled by, or been in the
possession of, anyone else.
36.

(R. 1512-1517).

Baxter also interviewed one of the witnesses in

Barr's report.
Marija Griparic.

The witness was a bank teller by the name of
Ms. Griparic recognized the Travelers Cheques

and the signatures on them.
tion of the person who had

She provided Baxter with a descripcashed the Cheques.

Baxter

then

showed Ms. Griparic a photo line-up and asked her if the person
who

had

cashed

the

Cheques

was

in

the

photo

Griparic identified the photograph of Pauze.
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line-up.

(R. 1505-1512).

Ms.

37.

On

July

24, 1991, Baxter

arrested

Pauze

and

charged him with fraud, possession of property obtained by crime,
and uttering a forged document.
38.

(R. 1517-1519).

At the time Pauze was arrested, Baxter told him

that his fingerprints had been found on Nicholls7
Cheques.

Travelers

Pauze told Baxter that his fingerprints were on the

Cheques because he had handled the Cheques while in Nicholls7
office.

He said that he had dropped by to see Nicholls and that

Nicholls had showed him a large quantity of Travelers Cheques.
He told Baxter that in disbelief he picked up the Travelers
Cheques and handled them.

Pauze did not say that anyone other

than Nicholls was in the office when he supposedly handled the
Cheques.

(R. 1519-1521).
39.

After arresting Pauze, Baxter immediately called

Nicholls to confirm again that no one had seen or touched his
Travelers Cheques.

Nicholls confirmed it.

Baxter then told

Nicholls that Pauze7s fingerprints had been found on the Cheques
and that Pauze had been arrested.

Nicholls did not comment.

Barr told Nicholls that Nicholls would be the complainant and
would be expected to give evidence in court as the victim in this
matter.

(R. 1521-1522).
40.

On October 22, 1991, Baxter prepared a summary of

Nicholls7 anticipated testimony against Pauze.
referred to as a 77will-say77 statement —

-13-

This summary

—

was based on information

in the report and on information obtained from Baxter's meeting
with Nicholls and his lawyer on July 17, 1991.

Baxter sent the

statement to Nicholls and his counsel and asked them to review it
for accuracy.
41.

(R. 1522-1524).
The

following

day, October

23, 1991, Nicholls

faxed a letter to Baxter stating that Baxter was continuing to
pressure him into signing the statement and that the statement
was inaccurate and misleading and did not state the whole truth.
(R. 50, 1523-1525).
42.

After Baxter's receipt of the faxed letter, Baxter

telephoned Nicholls to discuss the proposed statement.

Baxter

tape-recorded the conversation because the letter he had received
from Nicholls was very suspicious and because he wanted his partner to be able to hear the conversation with Nicholls.

The let-

ter from Nicholls referred to a letter from Baxter demanding that
Nicholls sign the statement, when in fact Baxter had not asked
Nicholls to sign it.
43.

(R. 1524-1525, Exhibit 18-D).

When Nicholls was examined

at trial about his

telephone conversation with Baxter, Nicholls stated that Baxter
screamed at him and threatened him that if he did not sign the
proposed statement he was going to make sure he did not get his
money back in his Utah lawsuit.
44.

(R. 1344, 1359-1366).

Baxter's tape-recording of the conversation was

then played to the court.

It demonstrated that Baxter never

-14-

screamed or made any threats against Nicholls.

It also demon-

strated that Baxter never demanded that Nicholls sign the statement.

On the contrary, it showed that Baxter told Nicholls that

he had never asked him to sign the statement, but simply repeatedly asked Nicholls to specify what was wrong with the statement
so that corrections could be made.

The tape-recording clearly

evidenced Nicholls' refusal to do so.

(R. 1528, Exhibits 18-D

and 19-D).
45.

Baxter learned that Pauze was scheduled to appear

in court on October 29, 1991.

Baxter contacted four bank tellers

that he wanted to call as witnesses to identify Pauze as the person who cashed the Cheques.

He asked the bank tellers to come to

court that day to see if they could positively identify Pauze.
They agreed to meet at the court prior to the hearing.

When they

arrived at the court, they learned that Pauze's hearing had been
held at an earlier time, so they were unable to see Pauze.

At

that time, though, Baxter asked the bank tellers to identify the
Travelers Cheques that had been cashed by Pauze and also showed
the bank tellers the photo
identified

Pauze

Cheques at issue.
46.

as

the

line-up.

person

who

All of the bank tellers
had

cashed

the

Travelers

(R. 1528-1529, Exhibit 17-D).

Baxter

subsequently

spoke

with

one

other

bank

teller who also identified Pauze as the person who had cashed the
Cheques.

(R. 1530-1531).
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47.
ruary 2, 1992.

Pauze's preliminary hearing was scheduled for FebBaxter had been asked by the crown attorney or

prosecutor in the matter to bring Nicholls to the crown attorney's office to meet with her prior to court.

When Nicholls and

Baxter met with the crown attorney, Nicholls refused to discuss
the matter with her and said that he would give his evidence
under oath in court.
48.

(R. 1531).

Nicholls, as the alleged

victim, was the

first

witness called to testify at Pauze's preliminary hearing.

(R.

1299, 2477-2508, Exhibit D-ll).
49.

When Nicholls was questioned by the crown attor-

ney, he could not be sure that he had even purchased the subject
Travelers Cheques.

Nor could he be sure that he signed them.

In

fact, he could not even testify with certainty that he did not
actually

countersign

and

cash

the

Cheques.

(R.

2477-2505,

1305-1315, Exhibit 11-D).
50.

When Nicholls was cross-examined by Pauze's law-

yer, Mr. Morris, Nicholls testified that he had no recollection
whatsoever of dealing with any of the Cheques that were exhibits
before the court, that he did not know whether or not he purchased them, that it could well have been that his signatures
were not on any of the Cheques before the court.
2505-2508, Exhibit 11-D).
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(R. 1315-1319,

51.

Nicholls also testified at the preliminary hearing

that Pauze was present in Nicholls , office on many occasions and
would have had lots of opportunities to handle the Cheques that
had been left in his desk.

He testified that many times Pauze

was left alone in his office when the Cheques were in his desk.
(R. 1318-1319, 2505-2508).
52.

Faced with the inconsistent testimony of Nicholls,

the supposed victim, the crown attorney voluntarily dismissed the
charges against Pauze.
53.

Shortly after the charges against Pauze were dis-

missed,

Pauze

against

American

Department.
54.

(R. 1353, 2535-2536).

filed

a

$2

Express

million
and

the

malicious

prosecution

Metropolitan

Toronto

suit

Police

(R. 1399, 708-720, Exhibit D-8).
Because both Pauze and Nicholls then had lawsuits

pending against American Express, they agreed to cooperate with
each other in their respective lawsuits and to exchange documents
and information.
55.

(R. 1327, 1393, 1409-1411).

On June 23, 1992, Pauze accompanied Nicholls to

Salt Lake City and attended the hearing on Nicholls7 first motion
for summary judgment.

During this hearing it was disclosed pub-

licly for the first time that Pauze's prints were found on both
groups of Cheques —

namely, those purchased on May 8 and those

purchased on May 30.
exculpatory

testimony

This was an important point because the
given

by
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Nicholls

during

Pauze 7 s

preliminary hearing did not account for the fact that Pauze's
fingerprints were also found on the second group of Cheques.

(R.

1416-1418).
56.

On April 29, 1992, Pauze was deposed in Toronto.

In his deposition, Pauze disclosed for the first time that while
visiting Nicholls at Nicholls7 office in May, 1990, Pauze allegedly handled two bundles of American Express Travelers Cheques
from Nicholls' briefcase, and fingered through both of them in
the presence of Nicholls and a third person by the name of Len
Jones.

As stated above, Len Jones was Nicholls' long-time insur-

ance agent and friend.
57.

(R. 1384, 1406-1409).

However, Pauze failed to disclose that Mr. Jones

or any other third party was present when he handled the Cheques
at the time he was arrested by Baxter, or at the time he filed
the malicious prosecution action against American Express and the
Toronto police department.
58.

(R. 1398-1401, Exhibit D-8).

Nicholls testified at trial that he did not recall

the meeting with Pauze and Mr. Jones and did not remember Pauze
seeing or handling the Cheques.
59.
trial.

Pauze 7 s

lawyer,

(R. 1321-1323).
Mr.

Morris,

attended

Nicholls7

Pauze, however, did not attend or testify at the trial.

(R. 1315-1316).
60.

Four separate bank tellers, Elizabeth Joyce Job,

Marija Griparic, Teresa Olivieri, and Flora Ballarin, testified
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and positively identified Pauze as the man who cashed the Travelers Cheques.

(R, 1426-1481).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The

findings

of

the

district

court

should

be

upheld because Nicholls has failed to meet his burden of persuasion.

He has failed to "marshal the evidence" in support of the

findings and has failed to show that the findings are "clearly
erroneous."

Rather than marshaling the evidence in support of

the court's findings, as required by Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of

Civil Procedure

and

discussed

in Reid

Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899-900

v. Mutual

of

Omaha

(Utah 1989), Nicholls has

simply argued that the findings should be overturned.

Moreover,

he has failed to show how the court's findings are against the
clear weight of the evidence.
The findings should also be upheld because they are
consistent with and supported by the evidence adduced at trial.
The pivotal finding made by the district court was that Nicholls7
Travelers Cheques were not lost or stolen.

Ten separate reasons

were given in support of this finding, including the fact that
the court found Nicholls7 testimony to be neither credible nor
plausible

and

the

fact

that Nicholls7

trial

testimony

on

an

important point was totally belied and refuted by a tape recording of the subject telephone conversation.
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2.

The

district

court

properly

denied

Nicholls'

motions for summary judgment because of the existence of genuine
issues of material facts —

namely, whether the Cheques had been

lost or stolen and whether Nicholls had received value from them.
These factual issues turned on Nicholls' credibility and therefore were not appropriate for summary judgment.

When both of

Nicholls' motions for summary judgment were heard, there was significant evidence presented to the court showing the discrepancies

and

inconsistencies

in Nicholls' testimony,

credibility to be in serious doubt.

causing

his

When the hearing on the

first motion for summary judgment was held, American Express submitted evidence showing (1) Nicholls' suspicious handling of the
Cheques, (2) the fact that Pauze's fingerprints were found on the
Cheques, and

(3) Nicholls' incredible testimony at Pauze's pre-

liminary hearing.

Based on these arguments, the district court

properly denied the motion.
When the hearing on the second motion for summary judgment was heard, American Express submitted not only the evidence
from the first motion but also additional evidence from the depositions of Pauze, the five bank tellers who identified Pauze as
having

cashed

the

Cheques, Nicholls7

brother,

Brad

Nicholls,

Nicholls' accountant who loaned him some of the money to buy the
Cheques, Debbie Jones, and another bank investigator.

-20-

Based on

this overwhelming evidence, the district court correctly denied
the motion.
3.

The district court did not err in taxing costs

against Nicholls.

These costs included the deposition costs and

the witness travel

costs.

The depositions taken by American

Express were taken

in good

faith

and were

development and presentation of the case.

essential

for the

All of the depositions

were used in the various pretrial memoranda, and several of the
depositions were read at trial.

The travel costs for Baxter were

appropriately taxed because he was not deposed and the costs for
him to travel here and be a live witness at trial were less than
or equal to what it would have cost to depose him.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ENTERED BY THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD BE
UPHELD.
The findings entered by the district court should stand

because Nicholls has failed to "marshal the evidence" in support
of his findings and has failed to show that the findings are
"clearly erroneous."

In addition, the findings are supported by

and consistent with the evidence adduced at trial.

In his brief,

Nicholls essentially is asking this Court to reverse the lower
court.

By making this request, Nicholls appropriately bears a

heavy burden of persuasion —

one that he has not even attempted
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to

meet

and

cannot

satisfy

given

the

overwhelming

evidence

against him.
A.

Nicholls Not Only Has Failed To "Marshal The Evidence"
In Support Of The Findings But Has Also Failed To Show
That The Findings Are "Clearly Erroneous."
As

acknowledged

by

Nicholls

in

his

brief,

a

party

attempting to overturn findings of fact made by a trial court
must meet an extremely heavy burden of persuasion.

Rule 52(a) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the applicable standard as follows:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
Thus, to set aside findings entered by a court, one not only must
prove that the findings are "clearly erroneous," but must do so
by giving "due regard" to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Co., 757 P.2d 465, 473
application
does

not

(Utah App. 1988), the court stated that

of the "clearly

eliminate

the

In Henderson v. For-Shor

erroneous" standard

deference

traditionally

in Rule
accorded

52(a)
the

factfinder to determine the credibility of the witnesses.
This Court has described the party's burden of meeting
this "clearly erroneous" standard as follows:
To mount a successful challenge to the correctness of a trial court's finding of fact,
an appellant must first marshal all of the

-22-

evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even in viewing it in the light most favorable to the
court below. . . .
A finding attacked as
lacking
adequate
evidentiary
support
is
deemed "clearly erroneous" only if we conclude that the finding is against the clear
weight of the evidence.
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha

Insurance Co., 776 P.2d

896, 899-900

(Utah 1989).
To

overturn

the

district

court 7 s

findings, Nicholls

must marshal the evidence supporting the findings and must then
show that the district court's findings are "so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence."

More-

over, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
American Express.

Id*

See also, In re Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885,

886 (Utah 1989)(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah
1987); State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786

(Utah 1988)(quoting

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (when reviewing a
bench trial

for sufficiency

of evidence, we must

sustain the

trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.)
Nicholls has failed to meet his burden of persuasion.
He has marshaled little, if any, evidence in support of the district court's findings.

Instead, he has simply argued why the

findings generally should be overturned.
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Most importantly, he

has failed to show how the court's findings are against the clear
weight of the evidence.

Since Nicholls has failed to meet his

burden of persuasion, the district court's findings should stand.
B.

The Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law Entered By
The District Court Are Consistent With And Supported By
The Evidence Adduced At Trial.
The pivotal finding in this case is set forth in Para-

graph

3 of the district

court's written

findings wherein

the

court expressly found that the "subject Travelers Cheques were
not lost or stolen."

(R. 1034, Addendum 1 ) .

As demonstrated

below, this finding is overwhelmingly supported by the evidence
adduced at trial.

Indeed, Paragraph 3 of the written findings

sets forth ten separate reasons supporting the finding.
Express will

not

burden

the

Court by

reiterating

all

American
of

the

evidence presented during the two-day bench trial, but instead
will invite the Court's attention to the summary of evidence set
forth

in American Express' closing argument.

(R. 1586-1606).

For illustrative purposes, American Express will examine four of
the key reasons given by the district court in support of its
finding

and

demonstrate

that

each

is

amply

supported

evidence.
1.

Paragraph 3(a) of the Written Findings
Paragraph 3(a) states:
This case turns on the credibility
of
Nicholls, and the Court finds that Nicholls'
testimony was neither credible nor plausible.

-24-

by

the

It is well established that it is the exclusive province of the factfinder to judge the credibility of the respective
trial witnesses.

See State v. Bacrley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah

1984)("It is not our [the appellate court's] function to determine the credibility of conflicting evidence or the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom"); State v. Reed, 198 Utah Adv.
Rpt. 56 (Ut. App. 1992)("Because the trial court had the opportunity to view these witnesses

and weigh their

credibility, we

defer to its findings unless the record demonstrates clear error.
This appellate approach is consistent with the supreme court's
directive that it is not the function of appellate courts 'to
determine the credibility of conflicting evidence or the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.'" (citations omitted))
this case the district court did just that.

In

The court listened

to the testimony of Nicholls and the other witnesses and also
observed their respective demeanors while testifying.

After hav-

ing done so, the court found that Nicholls' testimony was not
credible or plausible.

Simply put, the court found that Nicholls

was not telling the truth.
2.

Paragraph 3(b) of the Written Findings
Paragraph 3(b) states:
In particular, it is not credible or believable that, after purchasing the second batch
of Travelers Cheques at the American Express
office in Toronto, Canada on May 30, 1990 and
placing them into a briefcase already containing the first batch of Travelers Cheques
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purchased on May 8, 1990, Nicholls would
leave the briefcase unattended in the trunk
of his car until he arrived at the airport on
June 3, 1990, would then hand-carry the
briefcase onto an airplane and travel to Sweden for the purpose of attending the equipment auction, would then attend the auction
and actually bid on several pieces of equipment (although never having the high bid on
any piece of equipment), and would then
return home without at least once opening the
briefcase to verify that it still contained
his Travelers Cheques.
The specific facts concerning Nicholls' supposed handling of the Cheques are set forth in detail in the foregoing
Statement of Facts.

The details are entirely consistent with the

above finding and are not being challenged.

What is being chal-

lenged is the court's finding that Nicholls' testimony regarding
his handling of the Cheques was not credible or believable.
mon sense provides ample support for this finding.

Com-

It simply

defies common sense to assume that one would purchase

$99,000

worth of Travelers Cheques for use on an important overseas buying trip, leave the Cheques unattended

in a briefcase

in the

trunk of a car for five days, hand-carry the briefcase onto an
airplane for a flight from Toronto to Sweden, attend an auction
with the briefcase in hand and bid on several pieces of expensive
equipment, and then return home without

at

least opening the

briefcase to verify the presence of the Cheques.

Obviously, the

longer it took Nicholls to "discover the missing Cheques," the
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more time Nicholls' accomplices would have to cash the Cheques
before the authorities could be alerted.
3.

Paragraph 3(c) Of The Written Findings.
Paragraph 3(c) states:
Nicholls testified that he had a telephone
conversation with Detective Peter Baxter of
the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department on
October
23, 1991 wherein, according
to
Nicholls, Detective Baxter screamed at him,
threatened him, and demanded he sign the
"will say" statement, when in fact, as demonstrated by the tape recording of this conversation (Exhibit 19-D), Detective Baxter did
none of these things.
As the record clearly demonstrates, Nicholls testified

at trial that during a telephone conversation with Baxter, Baxter
screamed

at

him,

threatened

him,

and

demanded

he

sign

the

will-say statement. In Volume 1, page 151 (R. 1344), Nicholls'
counsel, Mr. Anderson, was questioning Nicholls about his conversation with Baxter.

The trial transcript states:

Q
(Mr. Anderson) You suggested to Mr. Counsel (Mr. Roche) a while ago that Mr. Baxter
attempted to threaten you.
Did he threaten
you on the telephone or did he threaten you in
person?
A
(Mr. Nicholls)
He threatened me on the
telephone and told me if I didn't sign the
statement that he was going to make sure I
didn't get my money back on my Utah lawsuit.
Nicholls' testimony was consistent when American Express' counsel,

Mr.

Roche,

was

questioning

Nicholls

about

that

same

conversation.

On pages 172 and 173 (R. 1365-1366) of that trial

transcript, it states:
Q
(Mr. Roche)
And Mr. Baxter repeatedly
asked you, did he not, to identify what parts
of this statement that you claim were misleading, inaccurate or does not tell the whole
story, correct?
A
(Mr. Nicholls)
At that time Mr. Baxter
called me back, the tone and the voice of the
conversation was in a screaming match on the
telephone and I wasn't prepared to argue or
scream at Mr. Baxter. And I didn't want to
have any more part of the conversation and,
please, give me the subpoena.
Q
(Mr. Roche)
You are denying that he
repeatedly asked you to identify what parts of
the statement were inaccurate?
A
(Mr. Nicholls)
I am not denying that,
sir. But he was screaming. I was having difficulty paying attention to everything that he
said.
However, when Baxter was questioned about his conversation

with

Nicholls'.

Nicholls,

his

response

was

much

different

than

In Volume II, pages 153-154 (R. 1524-1525), Mr. Roche

questioned Baxter about his conversation with Nicholls:
Q
(Mr. Roche) Did you have a telephone conversation with Mr. Nicholls following the
receipt of this document?
A
(Mr. Baxter)
Yes.
Just a few moments
after this document was received and in
response to his phone message, I called him.
Q

Did you tape record the conversation?

A

I did.
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Q

Why?

A
Two reasons: one, the most unusual letter
that I had just received, this exhibit. The
letter indicates that there were problems with
this will-say statement which I sent to him.
It refers to a letter from me demanding him to
sign it, and I didn't ask him to sign it. It
was a most unusual letter that I felt I wanted
a permanent record of the conversation, plus
allow my partner to be able to review with me
what Mr. Nicholls said and that was the only
way I was able to do it.
Mr. Roche: Mr. Anderson, this is what we have
marked as Exhibit 18-D. It is the same transcript that we delivered to your office this
morning.
The court heard the conflicting testimony of Nicholls
and Baxter about the telephone conversation.
tape and read the transcript of the tape.

It then heard the
Based on this evi-

dence, the court found that the tape and the transcript supported
Baxter's testimony, not Nicholls7 testimony.

Both the tape and

the transcript of the tape proved that Baxter did not scream at
Nicholls,

threaten

statement.

him,

or

demand

that

he

In other words, Nicholls was

sign
caught

the

lying

important point.
4.

Paragraph 3(i) Of The Written Findings.
Paragraph 3(i) states:
At the preliminary hearing in Pauze's criminal
proceeding, held on February 3, 1992, Nicholls
did not act or testify in a manner consistent
with him being a victim of a serious crime; he
refused the prosecutor's request that he
review his testimony with her prior to the
hearing, and during the hearing he could not
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will-say
on an

even remember whether he actually purchased
the subject Travelers Cheques or be certain
that he did not countersign the Travelers
Cheques;
The

evidence supports this finding because it shows

that Nicholls failed to cooperate with the prosecutor prior to
the

preliminary

hearing.

Mr.

Roche

questioned

Baxter

about

Nicholls7 meeting with the prosecutor on the morning of the preliminary hearing.

On page 160 (R. 153 0 ) , Volume II of the tran-

script , it states:
Q
(Mr. Roche) Let's now move to February 2,
1992, the day of Mr. Pauze's preliminary hearing. Did you meet with Mr. Nicholls prior to
the hearing?
A
(Mr. Baxter) Yes, I had been asked by the
Crown Attorney in this matter to bring Mr.
Nicholls to the Crown Attorney 7 s Office to
meet with her prior to court as soon as he
entered the building. When I saw him in the
hallway, I asked him if he would accompany me
to the second floor of the Crown Attorney's
Office and he did so.
He and I entered the
doorway of the Crown Attorney's Office and I
introduced him to her and she asked him if he
would discuss the matter with her and he
refused to speak to her regarding the matter.
He said he would give his evidence under oath
in court and he wasn't prepared to speak with
her at that time.
Nicholls was called to testify because, ironically, he
was the alleged victim.

However, his testimony illustrated that

he was anything but a victim.
manner

He did not act or testify in a

consistent with him being a victim

of a serious crime

because during the preliminary hearing he could not even remember
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whether he actually purchased the subject Travelers Cheques or be
certain that he did not countersign the Travelers Cheques.

Prob-

ably the most poignant testimony during the preliminary hearing
occurred when Mr. Morris, Pauze's attorney at the preliminary
hearing,

cross-examined

Nicholls.

It was beautifully orches-

trated between Nicholls and Pauze's lawyer, Mr. Morris.

In Vol-

ume I of the transcript, pages 122-124 (R. 1315-1317), Mr. Roche
was questioning Nicholls about this portion of Nicholls' testimony at the preliminary hearing:
Q
(Mr. Roche) Let's go down to the bottom of
that page where it says, "Cross-examination by
Mr. Morris." Are you with me there?
A

(Mr. Nicholls)

Yes, the bottom of 32?

Q

Uh-huh.

A

I believe Mr. Pauze's lawyer.

And who is Mr. Morris?

Q
And he is sitting in the courtroom today,
is he not?
A

Yes.

Q
And Mr. Morris asked you this, the very
first question of Mr. Morris was this, was it
not? "If I understand you correctly, sir, and
correct me if I am wrong, you have no recollection whatsoever of dealing with any of the
Cheques that are exhibits before this Court;
is that not correct?" And your answer, sir?
A

"That is correct."

Q
The prosecutor says, "I am sorry, I didn't
hear that question."
Mr. Morris then says,
"He does not know whether he purchased them or
not.
You don't know whether or not any
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signatures on those Cheques are yours or not;
is that correct?" And your answer, sir?
A

"I am not certain."

Q
Next question, "It may well be that your
signature is not on any of those Cheques, on
those exhibits before the Court, is that not a
fact?" And your answer?
A

"Yes."

Q
"Now, Mr. Pauze is a gentleman known to
you for many years?" And your answer?
A

"Yes."

Q
"He was
answer?
A

in your presence

often?"

Your

"Yes."

Nicholls had a selective memory that was directed at
helping which ever cause was in his best interest, regardless of
the truth.

His testimony at the preliminary hearing directly

conflicted with his testimony in his affidavit, in his deposition, and at trial.

These conflicts suggest he was attempting to

defraud American Express and exonerate his friend Pauze.

They

seriously undermined his credibility.
Like the examples given above, all of the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are supported by the evidence adduced
at

1

trial.

As

indicated

by

the

district

court

on

several

Paragraphs 1, 2, 3(d), and 3(e) of the findings of fact
entered by the Court were stipulated to by the parties in the
Pre-Trial Order (R. 653-673).
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occasions, this case turned on credibility.
Trial, Volume 3, p. 38 (R. 1615).

See Transcript of

For two days the court had an

opportunity to judge the credibility of the various witnesses,
and most importantly the credibility of Nicholls.

In the court's

judgment, Nicholls lacked credibility and it ruled against him.
Since Nicholls has failed even to attempt to meet the
"clearly erroneous" standard and since the findings and conclusions are overwhelmingly

supported

by

the

evidence

at trial,

American Express respectfully requests that the findings and conclusions be upheld.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED NICHOLLS'
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE HIS
CREDIBILITY WAS AT ISSUE AND BECAUSE DISCREPANCIES AND INCONSISTENCIES EXISTED IN HIS
TESTIMONY ABOUT WHETHER THE CHEQUES WERE LOST
OR STOLEN.
It is well established that when considering a motion

for summary judgment, the court must consider the evidence in the
light

most

favorable

to

the

non-moving

party

and

give

the

non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence before the court.

Wineqar v. Froerer

Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991); Brigqs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d
281, 283 (Utah App. 1987).

Nicholls' motions for summary judg-

ment raised significant issues of fact about whether the Cheques
were

lost or stolen and whether he received value from them.
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These factual issues turned on Nicholls' credibility and therefore were not appropriate for summary judgment.
A.

When A Motion For Summary Judgment Involves
Issues Which Turn On Credibility, The Motion
Should Be Denied.
Summary judgment is not proper when a material issue

turns on one's credibility.

In Madison v. Deseret Livestock Co.,

574 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1978), the Tenth Circuit reversed a summary judgment entered by the district court because credibility
was at issue and because conflicting inferences could be drawn
from the affidavits and depositions on record.

In Madison, the

factual issue was whether employees of Deseret had knowledge of a
dangerous condition on the property prior to the accident.

Vari-

ous depositions were taken and affidavits filed in support of and
in opposition to a motion for summary

judgment.

The court

stated:
Affidavits are not a substitute for trial and
summary judgment is not proper where an issue
turns on credibility. Summary judgment should
not be granted where different inferences can
be drawn from conflicting affidavits and depositions. (Citations omitted).
Id. at 1036.

See also Baum v. Gillman, 648 F.2d 1292, 1295-96

(10th Cir. 1981)("Any action when examined under Rule 56 which
raises real issues about credibility, motive, or intent is not
suitable [for summary judgment] whatever the nature of the cause
may be."); Eagle v. Louisiana Southern Life Insurance Co. , 464
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F.2d 607, 608

(10th Cir. 1972) ("Summary judgment is not proper

when an issue turns on credibility"); Romero v. Union Pacific
Railroad, 615 F.2d 1303, 1309 (10th Cir. 1980)("Summary judgment
should not be granted where different inferences can be drawn
from conflicting affidavits and depositions.

This is particu-

larly so when an issue turns on credibility."); National Aviation
Underwriters, Inc. v. Altus Flying Services, Inc., 555 F.2d 778,
784 (10th Cir. 1977) ("Affidavits are not a substitute for trial
and summary judgment is improper where an issue turns on credibility as it did here."); Little Red House v. Qualify Ford Sales,
Inc., 511 F.2d 230, 234 (10th Cir. 1975)(Summary judgment is not
properly awarded when an issue turns on credibility); and Cordova
v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 639 (Wyo. 1986) ("When credibility is to
be tested, the witnesses should testify at trial.")
B,

When Both Of Nicholls/ Motions For Summary
Judgment Were Heard, There Was Overwhelming
Evidence Presented To The District Court
Showing The Discrepancies And Inconsistencies
In Nicholls7 Testimony, Thereby
Creating
Issues Of Fact And Causing His Credibility To
Be Placed In Serious Doubt.
Nicholls' first motion for summary judgment was filed

on

September

19,

1990,

answered the Complaint.

just

15

days

after

American

Express

(R 28, 66). At the time that motion was

filed, American Express' security officer in Toronto, Mr. Barr,
had investigated the claim, but no formal discovery had been commenced.

Barr's investigation to that point had included meeting
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with Nicholls and his attorney to hear his questionable story of
how he had handled the Cheques, visiting all 22 locations where
the

Cheques

had

been

cashed,

interviewing

many

of

the

bank

tellers who had cashed the Cheques, and speaking with other bank
officers who had dealt with Nicholls.
1230-1235)•

Barr was extremely suspicious of Nicholls' claim and

believed the claim was fraudulent.
Without
Express

(R. 109-115, 1224-1228,

filed

having

a memorandum

(R. 658, 1235).

conducted
arguing

any

discovery,

that the motion

American
should

be

denied because the case involved material issues of fact that
turned

on

Nicholls 7

credibility

or,

in

the

alternative,

the

motion was premature and should be continued to allow time for
discovery.

In support of the memorandum, American Express filed

two Rule 56(f) affidavits, one of Mark S. Webber, counsel for
American Express, and the other of Barr.

The Webber affidavit

simply stated that based upon American Express7 investigation it
was suspicious of the claim and requested an additional
months to complete its investigation (R. 83-106).
davit

set

forth what he had

learned

in his

Nicholls and Nicholls' questionable claim.

three

The Barr affi-

investigation

of

Barr stated that he

was suspicious of Nicholls7 claim and believed it to be fraudulent.

(R. 109-115).

Based

upon American

Express7

response,

Nicholls agreed to postpone the hearing indefinitely until some
discovery was performed.
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In the meantime, the investigation continued and discovery commenced.

Barr filed a report with the Toronto police;

Nicholls/

deposition was taken in November, 1990; and

exchanged

written

police
(R.

discovery.

identified
2

1501-1502) .

the
On

On March

prints

July

of

counsel

11, 1991, the Toronto

Pauze

on

24, 1991, Pauze

the

was

Cheques.

arrested

and

charged with fraud, possession of property obtained by crime, and
uttering a forged document.
1992,

Pauze's

preliminary

(R. 1517-1519).
hearing

was

held

On February 2,
and,

based

on

Nicholls' conveniently weak testimony, the charges against Pauze
were dropped. (R. 1353, 2535-2536).

Since

the charges had

been

dropped against Pauze and the Toronto investigation was finished,
the district court in Utah set the hearing on Nicholls' motion
for summary judgment for March 9, 1992.
Prior to the hearing, American Express filed a supplemental memorandum accompanied by a supplemental affidavit of Barr
and an affidavit of Gordon W. Myers, the Toronto police fingerprint technician who examined the Cheques and found the prints of
Pauze.

2

Attached

as

an

exhibit

to

the

memorandum

was

the

The name Paul Pauze first came to light in this case at
Nicholls' deposition when he was describing the circumstances of
some of the significant insurance claims he had made. One such
claim was for $85,000 and resulted from a fire on his boat. When
asked who was with him at the time of the fire, Nicholls mentioned Pauze, who he said had been and currently was a friend of
his. (R. 2443-2444).
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transcript of Pauze's preliminary hearing which showed Nicholls'
inconsistent and contrived testimony.

American Express argued in

its brief that three points demonstrated the existence of a genuine

dispute

as

to

whether

the

Cheques

were

lost

or

stolen:

(1) Nicholls' suspicious handling of the Cheques, (2) the fact
that Nicholls' close friend and business associate's fingerprints
were found on the Cheques, and (3) Nicholls' incredible testimony
at Pauze's preliminary hearing.

It argued that the resolution of

this key factual issue turned on Nicholls' credibility, which had
been

seriously

called

into

question,

and

that

motion for summary judgment should be denied.

therefore

the

The district court

agreed and denied the motion and set the case for trial.
In May

1992, American

Express7

counsel travelled

to

Toronto and took nine depositions, including the five bank tellers who had identified Pauze as having cashed the Cheques, the
fingerprint

technician

named

Gordon

Myers,

Pauze,

Nicholls'

brother and work associate, Brad Nicholls, Nicholls' accountant
who had loaned him some money to buy the Cheques, Debbie Jones,
and a security

officer

from another Toronto bank who had had

prior dealings with Nicholls.

Also, Nicholls took the deposition

of Barr in Toronto.
On June

10, 1992, Nicholls filed another motion for

summary judgment, arguing that Nicholls' credibility should not
be an issue in a motion for summary judgment.
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American Express

filed a responsive memorandum arguing that, in addition to the
arguments set forth in its supplemental memorandum in opposition
to Nicholls7 first motion for summary judgment, the deposition
testimony of Pauze, Brad Nicholls, Debbie Jones and the five bank
tellers provided additional support for the fact that a genuine
issue of fact existed as to whether the Travelers Cheques were
lost or stolen, as Nicholls was alleging.

The district court

denied Nicholls7 motion on June 23, 1992.
Both

of Nicholls7 motions

properly denied by the court.
whelming evidence

for summary

judgment were

In each instance there was over-

before the court that showed Nicholls7 incon-

sistent testimony was incredible and created issues of fact about
whether

the

Cheques

were

received value for them.

lost

or

stolen

or whether

Nicholls

This evidence placed Nicholls7 credi-

bility in serious doubt and strongly suggested he was attempting
to defraud American Express.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT
AGAINST NICHOLLS.

CORRECTLY

TAXED

COSTS

After the district court rendered a decision in favor
of American Express and against Nicholls, American Express filed
a motion, pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to tax certain costs against Nicholls.

Nicholls objected

to literally every cost that American Express itemized
Bill of Costs.

(R. 928-942).

in its

After a hearing on the motion, the
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district court granted American Express' motion and taxed the
itemized costs against Nicholls.

American Express is entitled to

all of the costs itemized therein.
A.

Depositions.

The district court has the discretion to tax deposition
costs

if

it

finds

that

they

were

reasonably

necessary.

In

Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
[A] majority of this Court has approved the
taxing as costs the taking of depositions,
but subject to the limitation that the trial
court is persuaded that they were taken in
good faith and, in the light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the
development and presentation of the case.
Id. at 774.

Thus, the allowance of the costs of depositions is

within the sound discretion of the district court.

See also

Lloyds Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507,
512

(Utah

Ct. App.

1988)(whether

costs

should

be

awarded

is

within the sound discretion of the trial court).
The depositions taken by American Express were taken in
good faith and were essential for the development and presentation of the case.

Nicholls was the party who chose to bring this

lawsuit in Utah where absolutely none of the witnesses resided.
American Express had to travel to Toronto, Canada, to take the
depositions of non-party witnesses.

Since literally all of the

witnesses resided outside of the country and therefore outside of
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the subpoena power of the court, methods of discovery other than
by deposition were impossible.

All of the depositions taken by

American Express in Toronto were used and cited in various pretrial memoranda, and
trial.

Contrary

several of the depositions were read

at

to Nicholls' assertions, it would have been

unreasonable for American Express not to take these depositions.
Accordingly, American Express' costs for these depositions were
properly taxed against Nicholls, and the district court's decision should be affirmed.
B.

Witness Travel Costs and Expenses.

American Express is entitled to recover its costs for
3
the travel expenses of Detective Peter Baxter to attend trial.
Detective Baxter was a key witness who was not hostile toward
American

Express.

American

Express

concedes

that

Detective

Baxter was not subpoenaed; the Utah district court did not have
subpoena power over a police officer in a foreign country.

The

Toronto police department was willing to make Baxter available

3

In his Brief, at p. 31, Nicholls asserts that it was
improper for American Express to obtain the costs of Jane Egan.
However, a careful analysis of American Express' Bill of Costs
indicates that American Express did not request and was not
awarded the costs associated with her.
Baxter and Ms. Egan
stayed at the Red Lion Hotel.
The bill for their rooms was
$906.15.
That was divided by two, equalling $453.08 for each.
The additional $500.00 paid to Detective Baxter was for his
travel and meals.
The hotel bill of $453.08 plus the $500.00
travel and meals expense equals the $953.08 set forth in American
Express' Bill of Costs.
-41-

and Baxter himself was willing to be available to testify at
trial so long as his travel costs and expenses were paid.

The

travel costs and expenses were reasonable and necessary for him
to testify at trial.
In his Brief, Nicholls objected to the court taxing
costs for Baxter's travel and expenses to come to Utah.
late 's Brief at p. 31.

Appel-

He implies that Baxter's deposition

should have been taken in Toronto.

However, based upon the fact

that Nicholls objected to the costs of every deposition taken in
Toronto, the same objection would undoubtedly have been asserted.
Even if Baxter's deposition would have been taken in Toronto, the
costs for that deposition would likely have been as much, if not
more than, the costs incurred as a result of Baxter being present
at trial.

Baxter was a key witness because he was the chief

investigating officer in the case involving Nicholls and Pauze.
His deposition would likely have taken at least a day and maybe
longer.

Based upon the charge of $972.00 for the transcript of

the deposition of Pauze, it is likely and almost certain that a
transcript of a deposition taken of Baxter would have cost in
excess of the $953.08 that American Express sought for Baxter's
travel expenses.
Salt Lake

Not only are the costs for Baxter to travel to

less than the costs that

likely would

have been

incurred to take his deposition in Toronto, the district court
had the benefit of a live witness at trial.
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In short, the costs

sought for Baxter were less than what the costs would have been
if American Express had taken his deposition in Toronto and were
reasonable and necessary under the circumstances.

Therefore, the

Court should affirm the district court's decision to tax Baxter's
travel expenses against Nicholls.
CONCLUSION
The findings and conclusions entered by the district
court

should

affirmed.
adduced

be

upheld

and

the

court's

judgment

should

be

They are consistent with and supported by the evidence

at

trial.

The

district

court's

denial

motions for summary judgment should be affirmed.

of Nicholls'

There was over-

whelming evidence before the court showing issues of fact as to
whether

the

Cheques

were

received value for them.

lost

or

stolen

or whether

Nicholls

These issues turned on Nicholls' credi-

bility and therefore were not appropriate for summary judgment.
The

district

should

court's

be affirmed.

decision

to

tax

costs

against

The costs were reasonable

under the circumstances.
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and

Nicholls
necessary
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ADDENDUM 1
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

RICHARD DOUGLAS (DOUG)
NICHOLLS,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL
RELATED SERVICES COMPANY,
INC., a New York corporation,
Defendant.

)
)
)

Civil No. 900904706CN
Judge Anne M. Stirba

)
* * * * * * * *

This case was tried to the Court sitting without a jury
on July 7, 8, and 14, 1992.

Plaintiff Richard Douglas (Doug)

Nicholls ("NiclioHs") was represented by Walker E. Anderson and
by Robert J. Fenn and Colin G. James of Dubernet, Stewart & Fenn.
Defendant American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc.
("American Express") was represented by Kent O. Roche and Mark S.
Webber of Parsons Behle & Latimer.
The Court, having now heard the evidence presented by
the parties

at trial, having

judged

the credibility

of the

US"

witnesses, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby enters
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
American

Nicholls purchased a total of $99,000.00 (U.S.) in

Express

Travelers

Cheques.

He

(U.S.) of Travelers Cheques on May 8 #

purchased

$17,000.00

1990 and purchased the

remaining $82,000.00 (U.S.) of Travelers Cheques on May 30, 1990.
2.

On June

8, 1990, Nicholls reported

to

American

Express that the subject Travelers Cheques had been lost or stolen.

After American Express refused his demand that it issue

replacement cheques or refund his money, Nicholls commenced this
action, asserting claims for breach of contract, mental anguish
and distress, negligence and reckless indifference, conversion,
and constructive fraud.
3.
stolen.

The

subject Travelers

Cheques were

not

lost or

This finding is based upon all the evidence adduced at

trial, including, but not limited to, the following:
(a)

This

case

turns

on

the

credibility

of

Nicholls, and the Court finds that Nicholls' testimony was neither credible nor plausible;
(b)

In particular, it is not credible or believ-

able that, after purchasing the second batch of Travelers Cheques
at the American Express office in Toronto, Canada on May 30, 1990
and placing them into a briefcase already containing the first
batch of Travelers Cheques purchased on May 8, 1990, Nicholls
would

leave the briefcase unattended

until he arrived

in the trunk

at the airport on June 3,

of his car

1990, would

then

hand-carry the briefcase onto an airplane and travel to Sweden
for the purpose of attending the equipment auction, would then
attend the auction and actually bid on several pieces of equipment

(although never having the high bid on any piece of equip-

ment) , and would then return home without at least once opening
the briefcase to verify that it still contained his Travelers
Cheques;
(c)
conversation

with

Nicholls testified that he had a telephone
Detective

Peter

Baxter

of

the

Metropolitan

Toronto Police Department on October 23, 1991 wherein, according
to Nicholls, Detective Baxter screamed at him, threatened him,
and demanded he sign the "will say" statement, when in fact, as
demonstrated by the tape recording of this conversation (Exhibit
19-D), Detective Baxter did none of these things;
(d)

A total of $87,000.00 of the subject Travel-

ers Cheques were cashed at 23 different locations in the Toronto
area during the period of May 31, 1990 through June 7, 1990;
(e)

The

fingerprints

of

Paul

Louis

Pauze

("Pauze") were found on 12 of the subject Travelers Cheques; the
12 cheques containing Pauze's fingerprints included cheques from
both the first batch purchased on May 8, 1990 and the second
batch purchased on May 30, 1990;
(f)

Pauze was also identified

bank tellers as the person who cashed

by four separate

certain of the subject

Travelers Cheques;
(g)
Toronto

Police

Pauze

Department

was
on

arrested
July

24,

by

the

1991

and

Metropolitan
charged

with

-3-

1035

unlawfully defrauding Nicholls by cashing a quantity of the subject Travelers Cheques and related crimes; Detective Baxter made
the arrest after Nicholls confirmed to him that, to his knowledge, no one saw or handled the subject Travelers Cheques from
the time Nicholls left the American Express office on the afternoon of May 30, 1990; when arrested, Pauze informed Detective
Baxter

that

Nicholls'

he had

office;

handled

Pauze

the

Travelers

asserted

to

Cheques

Detective

while

Baxter

in

that

Nicholls could verify this point, but did not disclose at this
time that a second individual, a Mr. Len Jones, was also supposedly present and could verify this point as well;
(h)

Pauze has been a close personal friend and

business associate of Nicholls for ten years;
(i) At the preliminary hearing in Pauze's criminal proceeding, held on February 3, 1992, Nicholls did not act or
testify in a manner consistent with him being a victim of a serious crime; he refused the prosecutor's request that he review his
testimony with her prior to the hearing, and during the hearing
he could not even remember whether he actually purchased the subject Travelers Cheques or be certain that he did not countersign
the Travelers Cheques; and
(j)

In light of the foregoing and all the other

evidence adduced at trial, there is a very strong suspicion of
conspiracy among Nicholls, Pauze, and perhaps even Mr. Len Jones
and Mr. Brad Nicholls.
4.
brought

by

The Court
Nicholls

further

in bad

finds

faith

in

that

this

an attempt

action
to

was

defraud

-4-
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American Express.

Nevertheless, the Court does not find that

Nicholls' action was "without merit" within the meaning of Utah
Code Ann, S 78-27-56 and therefore denies American Express'
request for attorneys1 fees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over this action and

the parties, and venue is also proper.
2.

American

Express

did

not

breach

the

purchase

agreements entered into at the time Nicholls purchased the subject Travelers Cheques, nor did American Express engage in any
tortious conduct against Nicholls.
3.

American Express is not entitled to recover its

attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
4.

Judgment shall forthwith be entered in this action

in favor of American Express and against Nicholls.

The judgment

shall dismiss this action and each and every claim asserted by
Nicholls on the merits and shall furthermore award American
Express its taxable costs as allowed by law.
ENqpSRE&^hnr^r^^ gay or August, 1932.

1P3T
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
to be hand delivered to the following on this f/

day of August,

1992:
Walker E. Anderson, Esq.
The Valley Tower, 9th Floor
50 West 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

KOR/072092B
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ADDENDUM 2
JUDGMENT

M C 2 8 I9V2
>« *o o,„ CourJ

KEITH E. TAYLOR (3201)
KENT O. ROCHE (2783)
MARK S. WEBBER (4940)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
201 South State Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

RICHARD DOUGLAS (DOUG)
NICHOLLS,
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL
RELATED SERVICES COMPANY,
INC., a New York corporation,

Civil No. 900904706CN
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendant.
* * * * * * * *

This action came on for trial before the Court, Honorable Anne M. Stirba, District Court Judge, presiding, and the
issues having been duly tried, and the Court having entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff Richard Douglas (Doug) Nicholls ("Nicholls") take nothing, that this
action, including each and every claim asserted by Nicholls, be

1039

dismissed with prejudice on the merits, and that defendant American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. recover from
Nicholls its taxable costs in the amount of
D^IED-jthis crffi^xday of Auguct7 1992.

^•£vV£-

BY THE COJJR'

ANN!
DISTRlCT^gOURT JUDGE

~^>«kA ^U. "*Ulr <^y
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing proposed JUDGMENT to be hand delivered to the
following on this //

day of August, 1992:

Walker E. Anderson, Esq.
The Valley Tower, 9th Floor
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Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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ADDENDUM 3
TRANSCRIPT OF DISTRICT COURT'S RULING

TtraSDAY, JULY 14, 1992

9;3Q A,M,

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

All right, thank you.

concludes closing arguments in this case.
on this case over the weekend.

That

I have worked

I've prepared my ruling

and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based upon my
review of the evidence and the evidence I heard at trial.
I listened to closing arguments with an open mind to see
if there is something that would change my opinion about
that and I can say that because I don't want you to come
away with the feeling that your arguments were
meaningless because they were not.

They were helpful to

me.
I would like to start by complimenting all
counsel in this case.

It has been a pleasure to preside

over the case. The evidence has been presented
interestingly, thoroughly and succinctly and I appreciate
all of that.
I am first going to go over what the claims are
of the parties.

First of all, the plaintiff claims

breach of contract by the defendant.

That the plaintiff

paid $99,000 to the defendant to purchase travelers
cheques in May of 1990. The purchase agreement that was
entered into provides for a refund or replacement of the
$99,000 in the event the cheques are lost or stolen. Now

36

1613

the plaintiff claims that they were lost or stolen.
Plaintiff also claims that the defendant has refused to
refund or replace the cheques and is seeking judgment for
$99,000, plus 10 percent prejudgment interest, plus
reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

The plaintiff also

seeks damages based upon a claim of mental anguish and
distress claiming judgment for $10 nominal damages,
$99,000 actual damages and $50,000 general damages, plus
reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
The plaintiff also seeks damages for alleged
negligence and reckless indifference by the defendant in
the defendant's refusal to refund or replace the
travelers cheques.

The plaintiff also seeks damages for

alleged wrongful conversion and for constructive fraud
and the damages associated with those claims.
The defendant claims that the $99,000 in
travelers cheques were neither lost nor stolen, and that
the plaintiff is therefore not entitled to obtain a
judgment against it or on any of its theories of
liability.

The defendant claims that although the

plaintiff may not have actually cashed the cheques
himself, that the plaintiff received value for the
cheques and conspired with others to cash the cheques.
The defendant claims that the plaintiff is attempting to
defraud the defendant by asserting a refund claim.

The

37
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1

I defendant also contends that it is entitled to recover

2

I

3

J 56 and the cases cited today as a result of plaintiff's

4

J allegedly bad faith claims.

5

J

its attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 78-27-

The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over

6

the parties, the subject matter of this lawsuit and all

7

claims, and that venue is also proper.

8

This case, in my

I judgment, does turn on the credibility of Mr. Nicholls,

9

the plaintiff, and the following are the Court's Findings

10

of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

11

On May 8, 1990, the plaintiff purchased

12

J $17,000, U.S. currency, in American Travelers Cheques,

13

J

from the bank of Nova Scotia in Woodbridge, Ontario,

14

Canada.

15

five of the Final Pretrial Order.

16

The cheques are identified as indicated on page

On May 30, the plaintiff purchased $82,000,

17

I U.S. currency, in American Express Travelers Cheques from

18

J the American Express Office in Toronto, Canada.

19

I cheques are identified also on page five of the Final

20

I Pretrial Order.

21

J form that it typically uses was in fact used in this case

22

J and a copy of that is attached to the Final Pretrial

23
24
25

The

The American Express purchase agreement

Order.
I

The plaintiff reported to the defendants on
June 8, 1990 and to the police on June 9, 1990 that the

58
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1

I

travelers cheques were lost or stolen.

2

I

the police commenced an investigation after that time.

3

I

The plaintiff made written demand on the defendant for

4

J

refund for lost or stolen travelers cheques of $99,000.

5

I

The written demand was dated June 17, 1990, and was made

6

I

on the defendant's form, receipt for refund for lost or

7

I

stolen travelers cheques bearing the number of E0007361.

8

I

The defendant refused and continues to refuse to issue

9

I

replacement cheques or cash to plaintiff of $99,000.

10

I

11

I

12
13

Each cheque speaks for itself.

The defendant and

The checks show

that $39,000 worth were cashed at 13 different locations
in the Toronto area on May 31, 1990. That $18,000 worth

J

14

were cashed at six different locations in the Toronto
area on June 1, 1990, and that $9,000 worth were cashed

15

J

at two different locations on June 4, 1990, and that

16

J

$21,000 were cashed at two different locations on June 7,

17

1990. A total of $87,000 in cheques had been cashed at

18

J

19

I

20

J

section of the Forensic Identification Services of the

21

J

Metropolitan Toronto Police Department received from the

22

I

fraud squad 178 American Express Travelers Cheques valued

23

23 different locations to-date.
On Friday, September 21, 1990, the document

at $87,000. Mr. Gordon Myers, the fingerprint

24

I

technician, examined the cheques for fingerprints and he

25

I

identified the prints of Mr. Paul Pauze on the cheques

39

1
2

that are identified under paragraph M in the Pretrial
I Order.

3
4

The prints of Mr. Pauze were found on checks

purchased on both May 8 and May 30, 1990.
I

The stories of the parties as to what happened

5

to these cheques, obviously are very much in dispute.

6

I The plaintiff claims he purchased the $17,000 in cheques

7

I

for the potential purchase of machinery at an auction in

8

I

Canada.

9

He did not attend this auction.

When he

purchased the remaining $87,000 in cheques at or about

10

J

1:00 p.m. on May 30, he testified he put both batches of

11

J

cheques in his briefcase and put the briefcase in the

12

I

trunk of his car.

The remaining $87,000 was to be used

13

according to the plaintiff to take to Sweden for him to

14

attend an auction there with the idea of purchasing

15

J equipment there. When he returned on May 30 to his

16

I office at 5:00 p.m., he claims that the cheques were

17

still in his briefcase in the trunk of his car.

18

I

19

I

20

J briefcase with the cheques were still in the trunk of the

21

I car, and there was no evidence that the car was broken

22

I

23

I opened without a key.

24
25

From Thursday, May 30, through June 3rd, when
the plaintiff travelled to Sweden, he claims that the

into.

There was testimony that the car trunk could be

On June 3rd plaintiff testified that his
I

suitcase —

that he put his suitcase on the plane to

ko

1

J

Sweden and he carried his briefcase on the plane. He

2

J

never checked to see if the cheques were still in his

3
4

briefcase.

On June 4 he went through customs, taking the

J briefcase to his room and claims he never opened it.

5

On June 5 he drove to the mine site in Sweden,

6

I but never checked to see that the cheques were in the

7

briefcase, was still in the briefcase. He put the

8

briefcase, he said, in the trunk of his rental car and

9

I

left it there while he was inspecting the mine site. He

10

I

did not purchase anything in Sweden.

11

I

12

I

13

He returned to Toronto on June 6 and still did
not verify that the cheques were in his briefcase.

From

June 6 until June 8th, he did not bother to check to see

14

J

if the cheques were still in his briefcase in the trunk

15

I

of his car.

16

J

On June, I believe it was June 8th, he took the

17

I

briefcase to work and for the first time he said that the

18

I

cheques —

19

I whether the cheques were in the briefcase.

20

I

21

I

investigator and to the police when he filed his claims:

22

J

The plaintiff claims that no one knew that he had cheques

23

J

or where they were.

24
25

he looked into the briefcase to discover

Then this is the report he gave to the claims

He reported this to the police

officer, Peter Baxter, on July 17, 1990. He said he
I

didn't allow anyone to touch the cheques.

+6&

1

J

2

I

of Paul Pauze for ten years. Mr. Pauze's prints were

3

I

found on 12 of the cheques. Mr. Pauze was subsequently

4

J

criminally charged in connection with these cheques and

5

I Paul Pauze told the police that defendant had brought the

6

The plaintiff has associated and been a friend

briefcase into Mr. Nicholls* office and that the

7

J plaintiff had opened the briefcase and permitted Pauze to

8

J handle some of the cheques.

9

J

time he reported this to Mr. Baxter that anyone other

10

I

than the plaintiff was present at this time.

11

I

12

J

13

J present.

14

Pauze did not mention at the

At the trial, Len Jones, a friend and business
associate of Mr. Nicholls, testified that he was also
However, Mr. Pauze neglected to mention this to

the police officer when he was questioned.

And certainly

15

I Mr. Jones would have been a good alibi witness for him at

16

I

17

J

18

I

19

that time.
There was also testimony at trial that Mr.
Pauze was identified by some of the bank tellers as the
person who counter-signed and cashed the travelers

20

I cheques.

21

I

22

I

Canada in 1984. He was the president and the only

23

J

officer and shareholder which apparently is permitted in

24

I Canada. He was the company's only full time employee,

25

I

Mr. Nicholls incorporated Lift Truck Center in

although he did have a younger brother who worked for him

TFTS-

1

I at this company.

2

On September 30, 1991, Mr. Nicholls testified

3

I

that he was forced to close the operations of the

4

I

company; but prior to closing Lift Truck Center, he

5

I

started Lift Truck Sales and Service Corporation, leased

6

I new premises across the street, and across from Lift

7

I Truck Center, and then moved five trucks across the

8

street and loaned the business $22,000. He sold shares,

9

his shares in the company for $1 to his brother.

10

Evidently, this is almost virtually without

11

J

consideration.

Certainly without any meaningful

12

I

consideration.

Mr. Nicholls became general manager of

13

I

this corporation at $35,000 a year, basically ran the

14

I

corporation, although his brother was president of it.

15

I His brother basically was the mechanic for the

16

I corporation.

17
18

Since May 30, 1990, Mr. Nicholls repaid a loan
J

19

to Debbie Jones in the amount of $20,000. Made purchases
in the amount of approximately $17,000. He had a $75,000

20

I

line of credit he used to finance operations of the

21

I business and he paid off this line of credit in August of

22

I

23

I even though the bank had not made a demand and this came

24

I

25

I close his business.

1990, at a time when he was claiming financial duress,

at a time, as I indicated, that he said he was forced to

^3

II
2

Mr. Nicholls' memory is superb on several
I

details in his life, except for some details pertaining

3

to the $99,000 of cheques.

4

Mr. Nicholls is a man of some reasonable or better than

5

reasonable means, but nevertheless $99,000 was a

6

significant amount of money in his financial life.

7

It appears to the Court that

His memory is superb on several details, as I

8

indicated, including a meeting at the prosecutor

9

Lustman's office, with the police officer, on his 1988

10
11

conviction.
I

12
13

involving the $99,000.

For example, whether he showed

these cheques to Paul Pauze in his office.

His memory is

J very superb with regard to discussions with various

14
15

But his memory is less clear on details

people during the investigation of the cheques.
I

There was a previous incident with Canada Trust

16

in 1990 where the plaintiff filed a claim that his Master

17

Card had allegedly been stolen with 15 cash advances paid

18

I

over a 28-day period, totally $5,000.

When he talked to

19

the clerk and she informed him that the bank had a hidden

20

camera, he then later called and said that he remembered

21

J making those cash advances in the amount of $5,000.

22

J

23

I

think this goes in part to the credibility of Mr.
Nicholls.

24

J

Although there was evidence of previous

25

I criminal offenses, as I indicated in court, the Court has

1
2

disregarded any —
J

3

absolutely disregarded evidence of any

convictions in 1971 or 1973.

This is a conviction of

pleading guilty to possession of stolen truck parts, but

4

J

5

I particular case and I have not placed much weight on that

6

I believe that this is only marginally relevant to this

particular conviction.

7

I

8

I

9

In this case, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the
allegations that the plaintiff has made.

10

In this case

the Court simply does not find the plaintiff's story

11

J

credible or plausible.

12

J

Nicholls, it is not believable that someone would leave

13

J

$99,000 in travelers cheques in a briefcase in a trunk

14

I which could be opened without a key for days on end and

15

J

not even check on them while on a business purchasing

16

I

trip overseas.

17

I believable.

18

J

19

I

friend for ten years, had fingerprints on several cheques

20

I

and there was evidence that he cashed some of these

21

J

cheques.

22

J

of conspiracy between Mr. Nicholls and Mr. Pauze, and

23

In a business the size of Mr.

I simply don't find that credible or

Also, the plaintiff's business associate and

I believe that there is a very strong suspicion

perhaps even Mr. Jones, and maybe even his brother, and

24

I

those are the others I believe the plaintiff is entitled

25

I

to look to in support of their theory.

**5
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Mr. Nicholls testified that his business
finances were disastrous in the summer of 1990. He
nevertheless opened a new business and virtually gave
ownership to his brother without consideration or the
consideration being for one dollar.
As far as evidence of Mr. Nicholls' lack of
credibility, he did testify in court that in this
conversation that police officer Baxter taped that Baxter
screamed and threatened him and demanded that he sign
this willsay statement.
of that in the case.

There was certainly no evidence

Mr. Nicholls has not acted as a

victim in this case, nor did he in my view for several of
the arguments that Mr. Roche made as a victim in the
preliminary hearing of Mr. Pauze.

And while his memory

is very good on certain things, he couldn't even remember
whether he actually purchased these cheques or countersigned these cheques.

I simply find that unbelievable.

I conclude that there is no credible evidence
to support the plaintiff's proposition that these cheques
were lost or stolen.
brought in bad faith.

I also believe that this action was
The plaintiff is not therefore

entitled to recover on any theory that he has claimed. I
believe that the plaintiff is attempting to defraud
American Express and has breached his contract with them.
Therefore, the Court renders judgment against the

kS
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1

plaintiff and in favor of the defendant.

2

J

With regard to the attorney's fees requested by

3

J

American Express, there has been no dispute as to whether

4

they are reasonable and necessary, and the Court finds

5

J

that they are reasonable and necessary incurred as are

6

I

the costs in this action.

However, with regard as to

7

whether I award attorney's fees, I would like the cites

8

of those cases again and I will reserve that issue and

9

J

issue a written opinion.

10

I

citations again?

11

MR. ROCHE:

So what are those case

Cady vs. Johnson, 671 Pac.2d 149,

12

Utah Supreme Court 1983. Jeschke vs. Willis, 811 Pac.2d

13

202, Court of Appeals 1991.

14

THE COURT:

All right.

15

MR. ROCHE:

Your Honor, I have got extra

THE COURT:

All right, that will be fine.

16

I copies.

17

I am

18

I

going to take that under advisement, though.

19

J

read those cases and then I will issue a written decision

20

I with regard to those.

21

J

22

J

23
24
25

I need to

Mr. Roche and Mr. Webber, I want you to prepare
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
consistent with the Court's findings today and the ruling

I

that I have made.

Is there anything else, counsel?

MR. ANDERSON:

I don't believe so, Your Honor.

**7
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1

I Thank you.

2

MR. ROCHE:

No, Your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

I know this is a harsh judgment

4

against the plaintiff.

I want Mr. Nicholls to know that

5

I this case was very vigorously advocated in his behalf and

6

J

7
8
9|

I do wish to reiterate again I compliment all counsel in
the case.

The Court is in recess.
(End of Judge's Ruling.)
*****

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1*8

